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I. INTRODUCTION

The history of civil commitment and confinement law in general reflects
longstanding attitudinal divisions among the psychiatric and legal
communities, patients' rights advocates, governmental agencies, legislative
2
bodies and other invested constituencies.
At the center of this controversy are two well established and, at times,
competing social values that attempt to fashion appropriate mental health
policy. On the one hand, involuntary hospitalization for mentally ill persons
diagnosed as dangerous or otherwise disabled is encouraged. On the other
hand, the slightest abridgement of personal autonomy and individual liberty
for these citizens is discouraged. While the medical profession asserts its
responsibility to treat dangerous 3 and obviously ill persons4 so that they are
effectively controlled, 5 civil libertarians seek to challenge psychiatric
judgements altogether. These advocates maintain that mental illness is
manufactured, 6 that civilly confined persons are in fact prisoners 7 and that the
"preciousness of liberty" doctrine demands that the practice of involuntary
hospitalization be abolished. 8
The results of this and prior debates have produced large scale reforms with
disappointing consumer-oriented outcomes. From the introduction of the
asylum and public intervention in the form of moral treatment; 9 to the
emergence of the psychopathic hospital and the mental hygiene

2

See ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (Columbia Univ. Press 2d ed.,
1949)(1937) (providing a compelling, though dated, analysis of civil commitment
history). GERALD N. GROB, MENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 4-12 (1973) (giving a
balanced account of constituency involvement in the cure and treatment of the mentally
ill in Colonial America). ANDREW T. SCULL, SOCIAL ORDER/MENTAL DISORDER:
ANGLO-AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4, 10 (1989) (examining the
historical developments of mental disorder and the varying accounts of civil
commitment by others).
3

paul Chodoff, The Casefor Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J.

PSYCHIATRY 496 (1976).
4
Darold A. Treffert, The Obviously Ill Patient in Need of Treatment: A FourthStandard
for Civil Comunitment, 36 Hosp. & COMMUNrTY PSYCHIATRY 259 (1985).

5JACK ZUSMAN, THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION: THE REASONS FOR STATE CONTROL OF
THE MENTALLY DISORDERED, in CAROL A. B. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT:
MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAw 110-13 (1982).
6

See generally, THOMAS S. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNES;: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE INQUISITION AND THE MENTAL HEALTH MOVEMENT 1-15 (1970).
7
BRUCE J. ENNiS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 2 (1972).

8Stephen J. Morse, A PreferenceForLiberty: The Case Against InvoluntaryCommitment
of the Mentally Disordered,70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 106 (1982).
9

Joseph P. Morrissey & Howard H. Goldman, Cycles of Reform In the Care of the

ChronicallyMentally Ill, 35 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 786 (1984).
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movement, 10to the more recent spawning of community mental health and its
emphasis on deinstitutionalization,11 one reality has endured: "while cyclical
patterns of institutional reform" have been the hallmark of America's response
to the mentally ill,12 the politics of abandonment has been and continues to be
13
its legacy.
This statement is not so much an indictment of those forces that largely shape
civil commitment laws or develop intervention strategies for effective
treatment. It is, however, a recognition that although we have journeyed
beyond the institutional "snakepits" of the past,14 the "right to rot" is not an
acceptable path. 15 Our contemporary social landscape, especially over the last
twenty-five years, poignantly reflects this theme of abandonment. Psychiatric
facilities, viewed in the past as nightmarish warehouses servicing chronically
mentally ill persons have been replaced by ill-conceived and poorly managed
new "asylums" in the community.16 And while treatment regimens for persons
committed
against
their will
continue
to evolve
through
psychopharmacological and other therapy-based discoveries, the best
available evidence shows that these interventions are only minimally better
17
than doing nothing at all.

Coupled with these disturbing realities are the commitment laws
themselves. No where else are the entrenched tensions that beset the

10

GERALD N. GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1875-1940 144 (1983).

11

Leona L. Bachrach, A Conceptual Approach To Deinstitutionalization,29 HosP. &
COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 573, 574 (1978). David R. Musto, What Ever Happened To
"Community Mental Health"?, 39 PUB. INTEREST 53 (1975). John A. Talbott,
Deinstitutionalization: Avoiding The Disasters of The Past, 30 HosP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 621, 622 (1979).
12 Morrissey & Goldman, supra note 9, at 790. Joseph P. Morrissey & Howard H.
Goldman, Careand Treatment of The MentallyIll in the United States: HistoricalDevelopment
and Reforms, 484 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 12,13 (1986).
13 Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits Of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,Homelessnes, and
LibertarianTheory, 31 EMORYL. J. 375 (1982). RaelJ. Isaac and Virginia C. Armet, MADNESS
IN THE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL, 250
(1990).
14

ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OFTHE STATES, 3-21 (1948).

15

Paul S. Appelbaum and Thomas G. Gutheil, The Boston State Hospital Case:
"InvoluntaryMind Control, The Constitutionand The Right To Rot", 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY,
720-23 (1980).
16

Howard H. Goldman and Joseph P. Morrissey, The Alchemy Of Mental Health Policy:
Homelessness and The Fourth Cycle Of Reform, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 722 (1985). H.
Richard Lamb, The New Asylums In The Community, 36 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY, 129
(1979).
17

Alexander D. Brooks, The Right To Refuse Antipsychotic Medications: Law and Policy,
39 RUTcERS L. REv., 339, 341 (1987). Mary L. Durham and John Q. LaFond, A Search For
The Missing Premise Of Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment Effective Treatment of The
Mentally Ill, 40 RUTGERS L. REv., 305 (1988).
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psychiatric and legal communities more evident. Challenges to the scientific
meaning of mental illness, 18 pitfalls in predicting dangerousness, 19 debate over
the promise and peril of involuntary outpatient commitment, 20 division over
the patient's right to refuse treatment, 21 disagreement about the efficacy of the
least restrictive alternative doctrine22 and other such matters, demonstrate a
woeful lack of consensus on how best to deliver much needed services to
psychiatrically disabled citizens, while respecting the intrinsic dignity and
right to self determination these consumers possess. It is not surprising that in
the wake of such acrimony over appropriate mental health policy,
deinstitutionalization remains a dream deferred for the chronically
disordered, 23 involuntary treatment for the homeless mentally ill continues to
escalate 24 and an alarming number of mental health systems users find
themselves displaced throughout the criminal justice system.25
The purpose of this article is to examine critically the role that both law and
psychiatry have played in casting mentally ill persons as deviants, citizen/

lStephenJ. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis OfMental Health
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV., 527, 528 (1978). THOMAS J. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, 1-3 (1984 2d ed.). R.D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF, 7-10 (1969).
19
Morse, supra note 8, at 95. Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness: Some Definitional,
Conceptual and Public Policy Issues, PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: VOL. 1, THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 91, 98 (1977).
20

Edward P. Mulvey, et al., The Promise and Peril Of Involuntary Outpatient
Commitment, 42 AM. PSYCHOL., 571, 571 (1987). Robert D. Miller, Commitment To
Outpatient Treatment: A National Survey, 36 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, 265, 267
(1985). Jillane T. Hinds, Involuntary OutpatientCommitment ForThe ChronicallyMentally
Ill, 69 NEB. L. REV. 346, 349 (1990).
21

Loren H. Roth, The Right To Refuse Treatment: Law and Medicine At The Interface, 35
EMORY L. J., 139, 142 (1986). Brooks, supra note 17, at 339.
22

Bruce A. Arrigo, The Logic Of Indentity and The PoliticsofJus tice: EstablishingA Right
To Community-based Treatment For The InstitutionalizedMentally Disabled, 18 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 18 (1): 1-31 (1992). Winsor C. Schmidt, Critique of the
American PsychiatricAssociation's Guidelines For State Legislation on Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 11 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CiV. CONFINEMENT 13 (1985). Virginia A.
Hiday and Rodney R. Goodman, The Least Restrictive Alternative To Involuntary
Hospitalization,Outpatient Commitment: Its Use and Effectiveness, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.,
81, 83 (1982).
23

Robert A. Dorwart, A Ten-year Follow-up Study of the Effects of Deinstitutionalization,
39 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, 287, 290 (1988).
24

John R. Belcher, Defining the Service Needs of Homeless Mentally Ill Persons,39 Hosp.

& COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1203 (1988). H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalizationand the
Homeless Mentally I1, 35 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 899, 899-903 (1984).
25

See generally, SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET. AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 1-15
(3d. ed. 1985). H. Richard Lamb, The Mentally Ill in an Urban County Jail, 39 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 17 (1982). Ralph Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil
Commitment, 28 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, 817, 818 (1977).
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outsiders caught in a crossfire of illness politics. 26 This examination will focus
on those values protected and privileged by the medical and legal professions
as reflected in confinement law and policy primarily during the last quarter of
the twentieth century. The social, economic and political power these
disciplines exercise in the lives of psychiatric citizens raises significant
questions concerning the future of involuntary civil commitment both from a
clinical and justice policy perspective. As such, these matters will be addressed
as well. No attempt will be made here to detail the historical dimensions of
abandonment in the care and treatment of the mentally ill. Similarly, assessing
other environmental influences contributing to this phenomenon (e.g.,
urbanization, immigration, industrialization, transinstitutionalization) is
beyond the scope of this article. While these factors are significant components
in the development of civil commitment laws, they are decidedly more global
in nature than the focus here.
Our aim is to provide a current account of how law and psychiatry, despite
their respective calls to safeguard individual rights and to treat the sick, have
fashioned an ineffective' system of care. We begin with a brief history
emphasizing the social, scientific and legal developments that set the stage for
present day civil commitment policy; we then outline in what context law and
psychiatry speak for the mentally ill, evaluate some controversial and
significant areas where treatment and/or liberty are sacrificed, and describe
the inherent social values law and psychiatry promote through confinement
practices. By carefully considering the manner in which involuntarily
committed persons are simultaneously subjected to and repeatedly forced to
choose among principles of freedom in the abstract and clinical interventions
in the extreme, we aim to move beyond the present climate of uncertainty in
civil commitment matters. To that end, we conclude with some tangible
recommendations for the future.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The first half of the twentieth century was marked by minimal activity
regarding civil commitment laws or policy making.27 While state statutes
reflected regional or even local interests in appropriate service delivery to the
mentally ill, many states provided only modest procedural protections to these
citizens. 28 In addition, some states recognized a practice of indeterminate
commitment on the basis of what can only be described as vague statutory

26

See THOMAS S. SzAsz, INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1987) (giving a
polemical account on the sociology of mental illness).
27

PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THoMAs G. GuTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

AND THE LAw 46 (2ed 1991).
28
Deutsch, supra note 14, at 215.
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construction; i.e., the person was a "social menace" or "a fit and proper
29
candidate for institutionalization."
Coupled with these lenient commitment standards was a belief on the part
of many psychiatrists that institutional confinement was far more humane than
30
the ravages of poverty or incarceration.
Through reliance on a
"need-for-treatment" approach, 31 physicians were afforded a great deal of
latitude in civil confinement matters. This latitude was indicative of a period
marked by discretion rather than procedure in the care and treatment of the
mentally ill.32 In fact, the majority of the states adopted this standard for civil
commitment from the 1930s through the 1960s. 33 The net effect of these
scientific and socio-legal practices was the swelling number of persons that
found themselves involuntarily hospitalized. In 1955, for example, the average
daily census of persons committed in state and county mental hospitals was a
staggering 560,000.The excesses of this period in civil confinement matters were substantially
the result of the state's unbridled authority to impose involuntary
commitment. 35 This authority is derived from two sources: the police power
and the parens patriaepower.36 The police power accords the states "a plenary
power to make laws and regulations for the protection of the public health,
safety, welfare and morals."37 Moreover, this authority bestows upon states the
responsibility to involuntarily commit mentally disordered persons whose
behaviors demonstrate that they are a danger to self or others. The other prong
of authority vested in the states is the parenspatriaepower. Under this doctrine,
states are entrusted with civilly confining persons against their will when they
are unable to care for themselves. This is generally understood to include an
inability to provide for one's basic needs; e.g., food, clothing, safety and shelter.

29

John E. B. Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Need

of Change, 29 VILL. L. REV. 367, 381 (1983-84).
30
See Stanley Cohen, The Punitive City: Notes on the Dispersal of Social Control, 3
CONTEMP. CRISEs 339, 340-51 (1979) (compelling sociological analysis of control and

punishment). See generally,Deutsch, supra note 14, at 73.
31

Deutsch, supra note 2, at 171.

32

Mulvey, supra note 20, at 575.

33

Myers, supra note 29, at 381.

34

Howard H. Goldman et. al., Deinstitutionalization: The Data Demythologized, 34

Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY, 129 (1983).
35Morse, supra note 18, at 529.
36

John Q. LIFond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30
BUFF. L. REV., 499, 502 (1981). NICHOLAs A. KITrRE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT:
ENFORCED THERAPY, 59 (1972).
37

Note, Developments In The Law: Civil Commitment Of The Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV., 1191, 1222 (1974).
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What is most significant about the concept of parens patriae, is the historical
value attributed to this practice of paternalism. It is deeply embedded in
Western culture and thought. Indeed, the disturbing dimensions of parens
patriae can be traced from Roman law to English law to colonial American
jurisprudence. 38 Designed to protect "idiots and lunatics" while managing their
estates 39 these duties were abused by avaricious and profit-minded persons,
leaving the mentally disabled all too frequently to their own devices. 40 Based
in large measure on the law of property, the Crown protected the heirs of
wealthy "idiots and lunatics" from disinheritance by invoking the right of
parens patriae.4 1 And, as for the impecunious, English law required that the
Crown assume societal responsibility to care for those individuals unable to
care for themselves. 42
With the independence of the American colonies, parens patriae was
understood to be vested in the state legislatures. 43 Later, this authority was
generally (but explicitly) reaffirmed by the Supreme Court to be vested in the
'[s]tate as [the] sovereign."44 Early appellate cases like In re Barker45 and In re
Oakes46 firmly established the court's jurisdictional claim in matters pertaining
to the protection of the psychiatrically disordered. All available evidence
indicates that parens patriae was relied upon as much for the protection of the
mentally disordered as for matters of property and wealth.4 7 In 1890, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court described the state's parental power in the
following manner: "[I]t is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to
be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to
those who cannot protect themselves.' 48
With the dawn of the twentieth century, this parens patriae theme was
renewed when a federal district court stated that "[a] state would indeed be
derelict of its duty if it failed to make adequate provision for the care and
treatment of the insane. The state is the parenspatriaeofthe insane."49 (emphasis
38

SCegenerallySir William S. Holdsworth, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, (Sir Arthur L.

Goodhart and H.G. Hanbury, Eds. 1956). Kittrie, supra note 36, at 12-40.
393 WILLLAM BLAcKSTOrNE, COMMENTARIES *426.

40Myers, supra note 29, at 403.
41

Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. App. W.Va. 1974).

42

Note, 87 HARV. L. REV., 1191, supra note 37, at 1239.

43

Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 415 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).

44

Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 394 (1855).

452 Johns. Ch. 232 (N.Y. Ch.1816).
468 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845).
47

Myers, supra note 29, at 384.

48

Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).

49

Hammon v. Hill, 228 F. 999, 1000 (D. Pa. 1915).
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added). Soon thereafter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reasserted the notion of
parens patriaeas a viable state mechanism for protecting the incapacitated and
for overseeing matters of property and wealth.5 0 As the Court maintained,
"[t]he doctrine... may be defined as the inherent power and authority of a
Legislature of a state to provide protection of the person and property of
persons non sui juris.' 51 (emphasis added).
In the late 1970s, Utah expressly upheld the parens patriae justification for
civil commitment by declaring it to be a legitimate source of state power when
hospitalizing mentally ill persons against their will. 52 And finally, a New York
appellate court recently enunciated the state's parens patriae authority by
declaring that a respondent's homelessness was the result of "serious mental
53
illness" and not a "lack of housing for the poor."
What the foregoing discussion reveals is how deeply interwoven the parens
patriaeconcept is in the fabric of American jurisprudence. In recent years, some
commentators have staunchly criticized the medical profession's widespread
reliance upon it when involuntarily hospitalizing the mentally ill.54 Despite
concerns for abuses in and sacrifices of personal liberties, other commentators
find the doctrine's underlying theme of social responsibility for dangerous and
gravely disabled persons to be sound.55 As we shall demonstrate shortly,
however, it is precisely this valued notion of paternalism (in its police power
and parens patriaeform) that continues to underscore both the psychiatric and
legal approach in matters of civil commitment; an approach that has resulted
in casting the mentally ill as deviants and contributing to a legacy of
abandonment. In other words, the historical value of paternalism as currently
expressed in the law, is responsible for the present climate of uncertainty that
plagues the mental health system.
By the mid-twentieth century, it was evident that social reform in the care
and treatment of the mentally ill was essential. Large state hospitals functioned
as primary care-takers for the growing number of patients committed against
their will. 56 Conditions in these institutions were abominable. 57 Not only was

50
5

McIntosh v. Dill, 205 P. 917, 925 (Okla. 1922), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 721 (1922).

1id. at 925.

52
53

Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424, 429 (D. Utah 1979).
Boggs v. N.Y. City Health and Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340,365 (1st Dep't 1987).

54
See Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy
Implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteriafor Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 395, 397 (1985). LaFond, supra note 36, at 526-35. Morse, supra note 18, at 628-40.

55

See Paul S. Appelbaum, Standards far Civil Commitment: A Critical Review of

Empirical Research, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 133, 134.
56
57

Grob, supra note 10, at 184, 189.
Deutsch, supra note 2, at 448-49.
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understaffing rampant, 58 but the qualifications and skill level of many hospital
employees providing basic services to mental health consumers was
dangerously suspect.59 Soft shackle restraints and seclusion rooms were found
in most psychiatric facilities. 60 Long-term chronic patients deteriorated to a
state of helpless institutional dependency.61 Brutish attacks by residents and
staff, at times resulting in death, were not uncommon. 62 And the vision of social
reform anticipated by the mental hygiene movement and the psychopathic
hospital was reduced to obscurity, not unlike those involuntarily hospitalized
persons whose promise of treatment translated into the perils of lifetime
confinement. 63
These abuses signalled a need to alter significantly service delivered to
mental health consumers. In 1946, the National Institute of Mental Health was
64
founded, and funding for community mental health care was made available.
In 1952 the introduction of chlorpromazine, an antipsychotic medication, was
hailed as a curative chemical agent for treating the symptoms of psychotic
patients. 65 At the same time, a nascent humanitarian belief that long-term
confinement of the profoundly ill produced warehousing, dehumanizing and,
therefore, harmful effects was popularized. 66 Court cases decided during the
late 1960s and early 1970s extended this awareness. Specifically, a number of
landmark decrees recognizing the fundamental liberty interests of the mentally
ill were upheld; e.g., community-situated treatment, 67 due process procedural

58

See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 375 (M.D. Ala. 1972).

59

See generally Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295,

(E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 612 F.2d (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc); rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
60
See generally ANDREW T. SCULL, MADHOUSES MAD-DOCTORS AND MADMEN: THE
SOCIAL HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE VICTORIAN ERA, 1-18 (1981).

61 See ERVNG GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
HEALTH PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 47 (1961). See, Nancy K. Rhoden, The Right to

Refuse PsychotropicDrugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363, 403 (1980). See DAVID J. VAIL,
DEHUMANIZATION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CAREER, 22-23, (1966).
62

Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1311 (5th Cir. Ala. 1974).

63

See Scull, supra note 59, at 171. See Scull, supra note 1 at 143.

64

Steven C. Schoonover & Ellen L. Bassuk, Deinstitutionalizationand the Private
General Hospital: Inpatient Unit Implications for Clinical Care, 34 HosP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY, 135, 135 (1983).
65
Bert Pepper and Hilary Ryglewicz, Testimony for the Neglected: The Mentally Ill in
the Post-deinstitutionalization Age, 52 AM. J.ORTHOIPSYCHIATRY, 388, 389 (1982). ANDREW

T. SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT ANDTHE DEVIANT-A RADICAL VIEW
189 (2d ed. 1984).
66
See generally Goffman, supra note 61, at 4-10 (explaining anti-psychiatry). See
Pepper & Ryglewicz, supranote 64, at 388 (discussing devastating affects on long term

hospitalization). See Scull, supra note 65, at 189.
67

See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1966).
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protections, 68 the right to treatment, 69 medical and Constitutional minimal
standards in treatment 70 and the right to refuse treatment. 71 In addition, state
hospital administrators alarmed by conditions of population overcrowding 72
and structural decay,73 considered their hospitals "bankrupt beyond remedy.' 74
And finally, legislators, responding to the clamor for institutional reform,
adopted a series of statutory remedies. In 1963, the Community Mental Health
Centers Construction Act (CMHC) was passed by Congress, making
community-based mental health a crucial service available throughout the
country.75 In 1965, the Medicare and Medicaid programs were enacted,
providing relief for mental health consumers receiving community-based
services and care. 76 And, in 1969, California passed the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act; legislation that set a nationwide standard for civil commitment based on
the criterion of dangerousness. 77 Now, not only was the need-for-treatment
approach essential in involuntary civil commitment decision making, but so
too was the patient's demonstrated danger to self or others. 78
These events triggered the massive deinstitutionalization movement that
occurred during the late 1960s. 79 So sweeping were these measures that the per
day number of residents in state and county mental hospitals reached a low of

68

Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remandedfor a

more specific order, 414 U.S. 743, ordefed on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstatedon remand, 413
F. Supp. 1318, 1319 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
69
See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
70

See supra note 58, at 373.

71

See Winter v. Miller, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).

72

EUGENE BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR. IN PoUTIcs: REPEALING THE MENTAL
ComMIMENT LAwsN CALIFORNIA, 52 (1972). KATHLEENJONES, A HISTORYOFTHE MENTAL

HEALTH SERVICES, 83 (1972).
73

Bardach, supra note 72, at 52.

74

Jonas B. Robitscher, Implementing the Rights of the Mentally Disabled: Judicial,
Legislative and Psychiatric, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH
CARE 142, 146 (Frank J. Ayd ed., 1975).
75

Myers, supra note 29, at 418.
H. Richard Lamb and M. J. Mills, Needed Changes in Law and Procedurefor the
ChronicallyMen tally Ill, 37 Hosp.& COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, 475, 475 (1988).
76

771d.
78
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138,000 in 1981.80 Deinstitutionalization brought with it an expanding array of
neighborhood services for mental health consumers. Outreach, residential care,
day programming, crisis intervention and other maintenance-based strategies,
reduced general reliance on psychiatric facilities for many chronically mentally
ill citizens. 81
Notwithstanding these advances; measures promulgated by the social,
scientific and legal developments outlined above, deinstitutionalization was
not without its shortcomings. Community support was not immediately
forthcoming.82 To this day, many mentally disordered persons find themselves
unwelcomed residents or guests of board-and-care homes, single room
occupancies, welfare hotels and flophouses. 83 Others filter through the
criminal justice system, somehow surviving in local lock-up and detention
centers or security prisons. 84 And still other psychiatrically disabled persons
marginally exist on the streets where they sometimes die homeless. 85 These
disturbing realities are exacerbated by bouts of involuntary re-hospitalization
or multiple hospitalization for the chronically mentally ill. 86 Even when
87
community placements are secured, the results are not always rewarding.
The clinical, controlled and predictable delivery of psychiatric services in these
environments often echoes the familiar regimen of asylum practices.
Many mentally ill lives have been punctuated by intrusive institutional
confinement. This confinement has been replaced by a neglectful community
care system, when featuring on-going cycles of short-term civil commitment,
incarceration or homelessness. 88 Perhaps most troublesome is the woeful lack
of effective community mental health services for mentally ill young adults
(between the age of 18-35). Possessing limited social skills, complicated by

80Howard H. Goldman et al., The Alchemy of Mental Health Policy: Homelessness and

the FourthCycle of Reform, 34 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 129, 132 (1983).
81id. at 129-34.
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See Rhoden, supra note 13, at 431. John A. Talbott, Toward A PublicPolicy On The
ChronicMentallyIll Patient,50 AM. J.ORTHOPSYCI-IIATRY 43, 47 (1980).
83
CHARLES HOCH & ROBERT A. SLAYTON, NEW HOMELESS AND OLD: COMMUNITY AND
THE SKID Row HOTEL, 189 (1989).
84
Darold A. Treffert, Legal "Rites" Criminalizingthe Mentally Ill,
3 HILLSIDE J.CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 123, 123-25 (1982).
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35 HosP. &
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persistent, and at times severe psychiatric impairments, these individuals
89
wander through life confronted by its stress and their own psychosis.
To be sure, the magnitude of society's failure to adequately provide for the
needs of the mentally ill during the last twenty-five years is immense. The
devastating effects "in terms of human suffering is incalculable. " 90 Driven by
paternalistic intentions, current state civil commitment laws and policies bear
out these unpleasant circumstances. Chronic patients are forced to choose
between two dichotomous and altogether dissatisfying alternatives: total
freedom from involuntary hospitalization or total confinement in the
restrictive setting of a psychiatric facility (or its functional equivalent in the
community). 91 Advocates from our legal and scientific professions have
bequeathed to the mentally ill an uncertain future in civil commitment matters;
a future where psychiatric persons remain citizen/outsiders. This legacy of
abandonment is directly linked to the specific areas in which both disciplines
speak for the psychiatric consumer. Because these issues begin to disclose the
values that law and psychiatry privilege, an examination of these topic areas
92
is in order.
III. WHEN THE COURTS AND PSYCHIATRY SPEAK FOR THE CITIZEN/OUTSIDER

A. On the Meaning of Mental Illness
Scheff

93

maintains that in the face of uncertainty both the legal and

psychiatric communities strongly favor a presumption of illness when
rendering decisions in the care and treatment of the mentally disordered.
Nowhere else is this more evident than in their consideration of the meaning
of mental illness. In most jurisdictions, the process leading to involuntary civil
commitment initially requires a showing of the substantive standard of mental
94
illness or a showing that the individual is suffering from a mental disorder.
The inability on the part of most state legislatures to operationalize this
construct has given the courts the role of "fashion[ing] a definition for the words
'mentally ill... thereby fill[ing] the void in the statutory hospital law."95 This
responsibility is complicated when considering the due process liberty interests
of the psychiatric citizen protected under the fourteenth amendment. Any law
which impinges on these rights (e.g., rights pertaining to freedom of movement

89

Pepper and Ryglewicz, supra note 65, at 389.

90

1d.
Myers, supra note 29.

91
92

1d. at 409.

93

Scheff, supra note 18, at 6-30.

94

RALPH RELSNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 453 (1990).
95

Dodd v. Hughes, 398 P.2d 540, 542 (Nev. 1965).

1992-93]

PATERNALISM

and freedom from bodily restraint), requires "reasonably clear guidelines" as
96
to their reach.
Confronted with the task of determining whether or not a person is mentally
sane, courts typically rely on the expert testimony of physicians and mental
health professionals. 97 This diagnostic judgement by experts subjects the
commitment proceeding and its outcome to the available medical evidence.
Some important strides have been made to assess mental illness as more than
deviation from the psychiatric norm in both Great Britain,98 and the United
States. 99 Additionally, other necessary efforts to construct commitment laws
satisfying patients, doctors and lawyers 100 have been attempted. Nonetheless,
the greatest difficulty with psychiatric testimony is its unreliability in the
courtroom, 101 especially when vague labels are relied upon to describe mental
illness. 102
Despite the numerous studies and research protocols documenting the
differences in diagnoses among psychiatrists and other mental health
clinicians, 103 courts encourage and depend upon this testimony in civil
commitment matters. The deferential posturing of most courts allows the
meaning of mental illness to be shaped by the attending physician and
treatment team. Charged with diagnosing and treating particular maladies, 104

96
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307 (1982) (essential question explored in the Youngberg case assessed the liberty
interests of a severely disabled adult male, prone to self-injurious and dangerous
outbursts and subsequently forced to wear soft shackle restraints restricting his
mobility).
97
Reisner & Slobogin, supranote 93, at 455. CAROL A.B. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST
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USESOF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES 1-15 (1963). THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTHOF MENTAL
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the psychiatrist defines mental illness as disease.105 Given that the medical
imperative is to presume sickness, this same logic is applied when rendering
decisions for purposes of civil commitment, regardless of uncertainty.106 In
sum, then, the norms of cooperation and accommodation govern the
commitment proceedings; 107 a process in which both legal and psychiatric role
playing have evolved into what one critic has coined a consensual and
"commonsense model" of madness. 108
B. Pitfalls in PredictingDangerousness
A second substantive element required by most states in the wording of their
civil commitment laws is the finding that some specified adverse consequence
will follow if the person is not involuntarily hospitalized. 109 This is generally
understood to mean that the person is a danger to self and/or others. While
mental illness as the sole basis for commitment was first rejected by the U.S.
Supreme Court in O'Connorv. Donaldson,110 this did not eliminate the inherent
difficulties subsequent courts found in applying such a standard; specifically,
there is an assessment of probability of dangerousness in every instance of civil
commitment. 111 Despite both legal and psychiatric efforts to understand
adequately and consistently apply this standard, the practical results have not
been promising. In short, this requirement is disturbing because of its
112
propensity for over and under-inclusivity.
A representative body of literature indicates that psychiatrists are inclined
to prefer safety and caution in their predictions of dangerousness,113 and that
over-inclusivity tends to be more common than its counterpart. 114 More
disturbing than these findings are studies that report the low rate of accurate
predictions of dangerousness or studies that demonstrate how harmless
persons are routinely diagnosed as dangerous. 115
10 5
10 6

Szasz, supra note 26, at 45-103.
See, e.g., Luis Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings,57 Nw.
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107
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While the psychiatric profession's inaccurate predictions of dangerousness
have fashioned a system of wrongful preventive detention,11 6 "both federal and
state courts continue to sustain police power authority in involuntary civil
commitment proceedings."'117 The complicity of the legal community
regarding the dangerousness criterion endorses the consensual values of
cooperation and accommodation previously referenced. Despite empirical
arguments advanced by legal and social commentators documenting why
psychiatric evidence should be significantly circumscribed11 8 or altogether
eliminated, 119 it appears that in matters of civil commitment it is "better to be
safe than sorry." Expert testimony is admitted into evidence because it is
believed that it "will aid the trier in his search for truth. 1 20 The underlying
presupposition is that experts can draw inferences from a set of circumstances
that lay persons cannot. Whether or not psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness meet this general test of admissibility, given the unreliability of
psychiatric judgements, does not appear to be particularly relevant from the
standpoint of the courts.
C. The Gravely DisabledCriterion
A number of states allow for the civil commitment of nondangerous
mentally ill persons by protecting those who cannot provide for their own
physical needs. 12 1 The American Psychiatric Association's Guidelines for State
Legislation on civil commitment of the mentally ill, has, in pertinent part,
defined this criterion as follows:
[The person] .. . is substantially unable to provide for some of his basic
needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety or [the person]
will, if not treated, suffer or continue to suffer severe mental and
abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is
associated with significant impairment of judgement, reason, or
behavior causing a substantial
deterioration of his previous ability to
12 2
function on his own.
With such a criterion in mind, some commentators assert that the American
Psychiatric Association is attempting to expand the scope of the state's parens

116

Morse, supra note 8, at 85.

117

Haddad, supra note 102, at 225.

11 8

Ennis & Litwack, supra note 101, at 733.

119C. MCCORMICK, LAWS OF EVIDENCE, 29 (2d ed. 1972).
12 0

EDWARD W, CLEARY, McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, at 30
(2d ed. 1972).
12 1

22

Note, supra, note 37, at 1223.
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patriae power. 123 This "distress and deterioration" provision is targeted at the
large numbers of second generation mental health consumers; chronically ill
patients living in the community, cycling in and out of hospitals, somehow
124
surviving in abandoned buildings and alleyways.
Coupled with these APA guidelines are efforts by some state legislative
bodies to extend civil commitment to persons deemed obviously ill,12 5 or to
generally broaden the statutory criteria for civil commitment. 126 These
measures are, in part, acknowledged as a response to libertarian critics of
involuntary hospitalization. As one commentator opposed to restrictive
commitment standards put it, "how real is the promise of individual autonomy
127
for a confused person set adrift in a hostile world.''
Patients' rights attorneys and other critics of this more recent trend in civil
commitment matters are concerned with the justice policy implications for
increasing the state's authority to involuntarily hospitalize people. 128 While
the psychiatric community and supporters of the psychiatric ideology favor
commitment standards based on medical criteria, 129 albeit with constructive
legal safeguards, 130 civil libertarians believe such guidelines will only foster
more unwarranted 13 1 and improper 132 commitments. In addition, these critics
maintain that the practical assessment of the "distress and deterioration"
criterion will subject mental health consumers to the increased and relative
treatment discretion of psychiatrists. 133 Perhaps most troubling for these
advocates is the potential loss of liberty interests secured during a flourish of
mental health litigation during the late 1960s and early 1970s. One of these cases
addressed, 134 why mentally disordered persons needed to be singled out as a
special class deserving treatment, especially when the treatment typically
123

1d.

24
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126
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resulted in institutional confinement? 135 These objections are predicated upon
what civil libertarians view as the psychiatric community's continued use of
questionable and imprecise criteria regarding definitions of mental illness and
crazy behavior.136 Although acknowledging the "scandalous conditions" in
which many psychiatrically disabled persons live, 13 7 these critics do not accept
the suggestion that civil commitment criteria should therefore be expanded.
As one analyst exploring this relationship has argued, too much discretion has
already been given individual psychiatrists in commitment matters, thus
arrogating what "is fundamentally a moral, social, and legal question- not a
'
scientific one. "138
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that both the legal and scientific
communities contribute greatly to the policy formulation of substantive
standards in civil commitment. While some psychiatrists perceive the
intervention on the part of mental health lawyers as a "holy legal war" against
state hospital psychiatry139 or as a "legal onslaught,"' 40 other psychiatrists
regard the judicial involvement as a welcomed move toward shared
decision-making. 141 Notwithstanding these opinions, some level of legal and
mental health systems interaction is evident in civil commitment matters;142
specifically, in defining mental illness, assessing dangerousness and
interpreting gravely disabled criteria. While some accommodation is operative
in commitment hearings (i.e, the courts reliance upon psychiatric diagnoses
and predictions of dangerousness), this value does not appear to be as
forthcoming in issues relating to increasing the state's parens patriae authority.
In both instances, however, it is clear that the courts and psychiatry speak
for the disabled citizen. In this context, both disciplines exercise a level of
paternalism, despite their apparent intentions to represent the best interests of
the mental health consumer. It is precisely this value which places mentally
disordered persons outside the normative social order, subjecting them to a
neglectful system of care. This dilemma is magnified when strong adversarial
and antagonistic situations develop. What follows are some selected areas of
intense controversy.
135

See Ennis, supra note 7, at 33. See also Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?,
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136
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IV. CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE: PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT AND A PREFERENCE
FOR LIBERTY

A. The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications
Of particular importance during the deinstitutionalization movement, was
hospital reliance upon psychotropic drugs which facilitated massive patient
discharge from public mental institutions. 143 These new medications were
praised by psychiatrists and mental health policy makers because of their
primary capacity to relieve psychotic symptoms; specifically, delusions,
hallucinations and agitation. Thus, persons previously unable to live in the
community were now able to do so, sometimes with only minimal support or
supervision. While the initial impact of antipsychotic drugs significantly
helped to reduce patient assaultiveness and disruptiveness, a dark side to these
medications surfaced in the 1960s and 1970s. 144 An alarming number of mental
health consumers experienced physical, emotional and mental side effects that
diminished the person's quality of life. 145 While some hospital experts believed
that the harm caused by these chemical agents were more damaging to the
patient than the psychosis itself,146 other psychiatric physicians minimized
147
their unavoidable impact, insisting that the side effects could be controlled.
Amidst this climate of psychiatric uncertainty, civil libertarian attorneys,
patients' rights advocates and other concerned citizens began exploring the
extent to which the administration of psychotropic medication was both
unnecessary and avoidable. 148 In some instances, courts have found that
medication reliance is administered strictly for staff convenience not patient
treatment. 149 In addition, inaccurate diagnoses have subjected many mental

14 3

See Scull, supranote 65, at 171. See also Brooks, supra note 17, at 345.

144

See Alexander D. Brooks, The ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Antipsyhotic Medications,
& L. 179, 180-81 (1980). See Brooks, supra note 17, at
342-45. See also Nancy K. Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV.

8

BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY

C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 363, 401 (1987).
14 5
Donal T. Conley, A Szasian Approach To The Right To Refjise Treatment: My View
From The Trenches, in THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION, 64 (David
Rapoport and John Parry eds., 1986).
14 6
Brooks, supra note 17, passim.
147
DONALD E. KLEIN & JOHN M. DAVIS, THE DIAGNOSIS AND DRUG TREATMENT OF
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS, 42 (1969).
148
See generally, Joel I. Klein, A Legal Advocate's Perspective on the Right to Refuse
Treatment, in THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIISYCHOTIC MEDICATION 80-86 (David Rapoport

and John Parry eds., 1986). Emanuel Tanay, The Right to Refuse Treatment and theAbolition
of Involuntary Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 1
(1980). Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Current State of the
Law and Beyond, in THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION, supra, at 7-31.
14 9 Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1980).

1992-931

PATERNALISM

health consumers to a forced regimen of harmful neuroleptics.150
Compounding these problems is the counter-therapeutic use of antipsychotic
drugs for purposes of punishment and control. 151 All of these factors recently
led a district court judge to conclude that the administration of antipsychotic
medications by pubic hospital staff has occurred in a "grossly irresponsible"
152
fashion.
Despite increasing evidence detailing the harmful effects and inappropriate
administration of drug treatment for psychiatrically ill citizens, most state
mental hospitals continued to rely upon this intervention believing it to be the
most effective mode of treatment. In the wake of this controversy, the
constitutional right of involuntarily committed mental patients to refuse
antipsychotic medications was born.153 The establishment of this liberty
interest was based on a right to privacy which emphasized autonomy and
self-determination. 154 This right does not pertain to persons either dangerous
to self or others, in an emergency situation, or to those individuals unable to
make a rational treatment decision. 155 The purpose of this right was originally
drafted so as to place final refusal in the hands of the consumer not the
clinician. 156 The practical effect, however, has been to grant the patient a right
of objection and to insist that the hospital staff review the person's medication
regimen. 157 Final authority regarding treatment decisions continues to be

150
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vested with the psychiatrist and attending treatment team,15 8 provided their
judgements correspond with the agreed upon practices of the medical
profession. 159
Although the right-to-refuse treatment doctrine was designed to curb
psychiatric abuses in the care and treatment of the mentally ill, procedural
safeguards ensuring this right have significantly hampered its effectiveness. 160
While the right to a due process hearing presided over by an independent
psychiatrist not affiliated with the state mental health system ensures that the
case is decided on the merits of the refusal, this private physician must consider
issues of patient competence or dangerousness, must assess the side effects of
the medication, and must evaluate the availability of a less intrusive treatment
161
for the patient.
This process was made more formidable with the decision in Rogers v.
Okin.162 Here, the court ruled that a judicial hearing was required on the issue
of competence and that the appointment of a guardian ad litem was necessary
for refusing patients diagnosed as incompetent. As a result of the competency
question, many mental health consumers declining medication return to their
previous chronically ill state. 163 Additionally, this latter guardianship
protection raises important ethical questions involving the substitution of one's
judgement for the diagnosed incompetent mental health consumer,164 and the
role that informed consent plays in a patient's right-to-refuse decision
making.165 Psychiatrists have criticized the legal system for abuses in
competency hearing delays, and have drawn attention to what they regard as
the real issue; namely, quality of care 166 not the "right to rot."167
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Subsequent courts addressing the issue of a non-dangerous mentally ill
person's right to refuse treatment have continued this focus on the matter of
competence.1 68 And, as we shall demonstrate shortly in our discussion on the
least intrusive means or least restrictive alternative doctrine, the shifting
tensions in the psycho-legal debate appear to be moving in the direction of the
medical profession's preference for treatment. While the U.S. Supreme Court
has declined to assess whether or not an involuntarily committed mental
patient has a federal constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, 169 other
federal district courts are addressing related matters. 170 Their judgements
reflect an ever-increasing erosion of the right-to-refuse treatment phenomenon
established by earlier decisions. As one court recently concluded, "an
involuntary commitment is a finding of incompetency with respect to
treatment decisions. Nonconsensual treatment is what involuntary
171
commitment is all about."
Notwithstanding recent legal trends, it is clear that civilly committed
persons exercising their right to refuse antipsychotic medications conjures up
strong adversarial sentiment among psychiatric and legal commentators.
Governed by values of providing treatment and safeguarding liberty
respectively, the results of their antagonism has alternatively fashioned a
system of ineffective treatment 172 and noncare for the mentally ill.173 This
dilemma is exacerbated by the controversial meaning and application of the
least restrictive alternative phenomenon; a doctrine that not only challenges
the quality of treatment but also the locus of care.
B. The Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine
The central question posed by the least restrictive alternative doctrine in
cases of civil commitment is whether or not the method of treatment is least
intrusive 174 and the locus of care least confining. 175 These matters challenge
clinical judgements regarding what constitutes the most effective psychiatric
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intervention,1 76 and medical and legal decisions about where that intervention
can best be administered. 177 The obvious and persistent tensions created by
such considerations are designed to satisfy the patient's interest in being free
from unnecessary and harmful treatment. 178
In the involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill, the least intrusive
means analysis is an important consideration in right to refuse treatment
cases.179 At issue is the careful balancing of the mental health consumer's
interests to be advanced by the administration of antipsychotic drugs.180 Some
commentators, suspicious of this approach, claim that rather than securing
efficacious treatment, "legal advocates have imposed a system of noncare in
the most restrictive alternative. 181 Others point to the swelling number of
chronically ill persons who, for lack of treatment, find themselves either
homeless 182 or filtering through the criminal justice system.183
More recently, because of the fallout of the least restrictive alternative
principle, courts are deferring to the medical community's agreed upon
assessment of what treatment is least intrusive. 184 While some jurisdictions
continue to recognize this doctrine on the basis of state statutes and common
law,185 this liberty interest is giving way to what the U.S. Supreme Court has
called "the demands of an organized society."186 In short, state mental hospitals
are deciding what is in the best interest of the psychiatric citizen; judgements
that carry with them a presumption of validity.
The problem with this approach in civil commitment matters is the unlikely
probability that professional psychiatric consensus will opt to forego drug
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therapy or hospital confinement when treating mental health consumers. 187
Essentially, they would need to admit that a treatment regimen of antipsychotic
medication and involuntary hospitalization possesses only limited
effectiveness 188 and, therefore, is not consistent with reasonable professional
standards in treating mentally ill persons. 189 Moreover, community-situated
treatment would have to be consistent with reasonable professional standards,
satisfying the "minimally adequate" treatment needs of the psychiatric
consumer. 190 This kind of deliberate departure from the medical model
approach does not appear to be forthcoming.
Aside from the problems of forced treatment and institutional care, are the
disturbing consequences of the court's more recent wholesale support for
psychiatric decision-making in confinement matters. The deference afforded
the medical profession's mode of psychiatric intervention presupposes that
mental health consumers are persons lacking control and judgement, needing
to be confined for their own good.1 91 Some critics denounce psychiatric
assessments citing what they believe to be the medical community's
manufacturing of madness.192 Other commentators resist judicial support for
total psychiatric decision-making in civil commitment and treatment matters,
maintaining that "psychiatric opinions are essentially political judgements."'193
Whether opposed to heightened psychiatric authority in issues of patient
treatment, or a firm believer that "the worst home is better than the best mental
hospital, 194 the results of the clinicolegal debate on the least restrictive
alternative doctrine have only further stigmatized the mental health
consumer.195 The meaning of liberty for the involuntarily committed person is
"social marginality, deprivation, and despair."196 Both the courts and
psychiatry have fashioned a system which one observer woefully concludes,
"harms and kills the sick."197 These outcomes are a product of the imposition
of legal and medical values that unfortunately cast the psychiatric citizen as a
social outcast. One attempt to minimize stigmatization that provides for
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treatment while respecting legal safeguards, has been the suggestion of
involuntary outpatient commitment. Amidst a climate of flux and uncertainty
in matters of civil commitment, this strategy ostensibly offers hope for a
necessary balance between individual and state interests.
C. Involuntary Outpatient Civil Commitment
A logical extension of the right to refuse treatment and least restrictive
alternative controversies is the issue of involuntary outpatient commitment. 198
The mental health literature reflects that there is no standard definition, shared
perception or agreed upon practice among states invoking this doctrine on
what exactly it entails. 199 Quasi-experimental studies offer only limited
information regarding outpatient commitment procedures 20 0 and patient
types admitted with expanding commitment laws. 201 Legal commentators,
nonetheless, have relied upon it to construct arguments outlining when state
intervention in the lives of psychiatric citizens is beneficial and problematic.
Some reviewers argue that compulsory community treatment is essential so
that the state does not discriminate against the poor; consumers
disproportionately committed to psychiatric facilities. 202 Others propose a
more selective reliance upon the practice of involuntary outpatient
commitment, restricting its use to individuals committed under the parens
patriae justification, 203 or pursuant to conditional release or outpatient
204
commitment statutes.
Despite differing views on its meaning and its use from both the medical and
legal professions, compelling treatment in the community is increasingly
recommended for chronically mentally ill individuals. 205 The hope is that those
persons with a history of failing to follow through on their treatment plans
(voluntarily taking prescribed antipsychotic medications and consistently
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maintaining scheduled therapy appointments), can be prevented from future
206
inpatient hospitalization by involuntary outpatient civil commitment.
A number of arguments have been put forth which address the advantages
207
and disadvantages of compelling involuntary treatment in the community.
Proponents argue that a population of some mentally ill persons cannot
experience the full benefits of living freely and autonomously in our society
without the impositions of some structure. 208 Involuntary outpatient civil
commitment ensures this structure, protects mental health consumers from
becoming disenfranchised and abandoned, and safeguards their liberty to the
fullest extent that their disability will allow. Supporters also point to the
possibility for greater comprehensive service delivery when treating patients
in the community; avoiding the reactive, crisis-oriented approach that governs
most state mental hospital systems.209 And finally, advocates of this position
maintain that psychosocial treatment in the community "introduces the patient
to the experience of living . . . in a nonpsychotic state."210 Therefore,

involuntary outpatient commitment facilitates an on-going process of stable
rehabilitation in a community setting.
Critics of this intervention strategy are primarily concerned with what they
believe to be another effort at coerced treatment under threat of state action for
noncompliance. 211 Concerns about the limited efficacy of available treatment,
especially when forced, suggests that individual liberty interests will be
sacrificed at the expense of mere social monitoring functions. 212 This raises
additional questions about the extent of governmental intrusion in the lives of
mental health consumers. Intervention in the form of compulsory community
treatment may lead to unwarranted intrusions elsewhere for an expanded
group of mental health clients. Specifically, because the dangerous standard for
involuntary outpatient civil commitment would necessarily be lower than the
inpatient standard, the need-for-treatment criterion would gain greater
prominence. This could subject many mentally disordered persons to the same
discretionary abuses psychiatry practiced prior to the inclusion of the
dangerous criterion. Inaddition, the right-to-refuse treatment doctrine would
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not extend to cases involving compulsory community care. "By definition a
person cannot refuse treatment while being involuntarily committed on an
outpatient basis. 213 Another objection to the practice of involuntary outpatient
civil commitment is the potential for abuse and the difficulty with ensuring
quality control. The outpatient relationship occurs in a non-controlled
environment between a patient and professional. Transactions are private and
monitoring of actual service delivery, both in method and manner, are not
easily verifiable. A final concern voiced by opponents of involuntary outpatient
commitment is the harm caused to the therapeutic relationship. Reliance upon
coercion significantly jeopardizes the likelihood that consumers will positively
and willingly accept treatment, no matter how efficacious the intervention may
be. A system predicated upon negative sanctions can only further stigmatize
persons already suffering from acute alienation. 214
What the preceding analysis on involuntary outpatient civil commitment
discloses, is how uncertain both the psychiatric and legal communities are
when addressing issues of effective treatment that do not infringe upon an
individual's fundamental liberty interests. Once again, both camps assume to
know what is best for the psychiatric citizen. Whether asserting a need for
treatment or a right to liberty, these professions exercise a degree of paternalism
that significantly distances the mentally ill from the rest of society. Although
some courts have recognized the right of competent mental health consumers
to refuse medication absent an emergency,215 and although arguments have
been advanced that assert the right of a competent outpatient to refuse
medication in a non-emergency situation 2 16 one thing is unequivocally clear:
courts decide on the issue of competency 217 and clinicians treat consumers as
patients that are sick 218 and incompetent. 2 19 The point is not that the legal and
psychiatric communities have no role to play in the lives of mental health
clients. Moreover, the point is not that the mentally disordered need no care.
The real issue is understanding the implicit values that underpin clinicolegal
decision-making and then evaluating what consumer needs are being met by
such an approach. This undertaking will significantly help to contextualize the
kind and quality of services provided to the mentally disabled. In addition, by
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comprehending just what values are protected by civil commitment and civil
commitment laws, it may be possible to initiate a system that moves beyond
the present climate of uncertainty and abandonment.
V. THE POLITICS OF ABANDONMENT
We have argued that existing psychiatric and legal decision-making
practices in civil commitment matters foster a disturbing system of care for
mental health consumers. Moreover, this system effectively treats these citizens
as the outcasts neither profession necessarily intends them to be. One possible
explanation for the failed service delivery system is the social values that
underpin psychiatric and judicial intercession. While reference to the historical
dimensions of paternalism has been cited as a contributory factor, scant
attention has been given to the various forms in which paternalism currently
manifests itself in relation to the mentally ill. As a point of departure, we
recognize that there is a fundamental clash of interests operating in civil
commitment matters; 220 namely, the rights of an individual to engage in
independent choice-making versus state interference justified on the basis of
benevolently securing the happiness, welfare and needs of the coerced party.221
Notwithstanding this tension, the intrusion into the lives of many mentally'
disturbed persons is significant and profound. In part, this is the product of
law and psychiatry's commitment to paternalism, a social value that is
recognizable by its three distinct forms.
VI. THE THREE FORMS OF PATERNALISM

A. Social Control
The social control argument essentially posits that involuntary
hospitalization is a necessary and acceptable response to a disabled person's
lack of behavioral control. 222 This position is further understood to assume that
the individual mental health consumer, contrary to the ordinary citizen, lacks
choice-making capacity and therefore cannot knowingly be deterred from
223
engaging in violent or dangerous conduct.
The contribution of the legal system in deferring to and then regulating what
psychiatry labels incapacity through dangerousness and/or grave disability,
demonstrates how this profession esteems social control interests. While many
courts attempt to ensure that full disclosure of the risks/benefits inherent in a
particular course of psychiatric treatment are made available to a consumer

220
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with sufficient faculties to reasonably understand what is being proposed, 224
questions involving the voluntariness of the consent225 and concerns about the
patient's ability to comprehend the impact of treatment, are part of the court's
decision-making role. 226 As previously mentioned, courts are increasingly
relying upon psychiatric expert testimony to ascertain whether or not
individual mentally disturbed persons possess choice-making capacity to
assume responsibility for their physical welfare. 227 When an incompetency
determination is made, the court may appoint a guardian to represent the
interests of the consumer. 228 When the psychiatric citizen is found incapable
of rendering informed consent in matters of treatment or confinement, a
substituted judgement must be made for the patient by the court.229
There is a striking parallel that we wish to draw between the court's interest
in protecting the welfare of mentally ill citizens and wards of the state;
specifically, minors. In fact, recent statutory language addressing guardianship
law states the following: "[A] guardian of an incapacitated person is
responsible for care, custody, and control of the ward.... [Such] guardian has
the same duties, powers and responsibilities as a guardian for a minor."230
(emphasis added) Moreover, massive support for the enactment of Adult
Protective Service statutes (APS) has occurred during the past fifteen years.
This is evidenced by the majority of the states having adopted some sort of APS
provision. 23 1 These statutes, designed to provide necessary treatment for the
mentally ill, are modeled after comparable statutes representing the needs of
children and youth. 232 And finally, while the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that juveniles possess a panoply of procedural rights ensured to all
citizens, 233 the substantive liberty interests of involuntarily hospitalized
minors are significantly circumscribed by parental judgements, provided they
receive the medical profession's endorsement.234 In short, the Supreme Court
224
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held in Parhanthat Georgia's voluntary commitment guidelines did not violate
the procedural protections guaranteed to minors in the Gault decision. "Parents
to
retain plenary authority to seek institutional care for their children, subject235
a hospital physician's independent examination and medical decision."
Regardless of the child's protest, if the parent's judgement is that their son or
daughter is mentally ill, can benefit from institutional care and is supported by
a physician's assessment and diagnosis, then the child will be admitted
involuntarily for psychiatric treatment. Such judicial decision-making
underscores the court's preference for socially controlling not just chronic
psychiatric patients but minors suspected of mental illness.
B. Custody
The paternalistic value of custody bears an important relationship to the
issue of suspicion of illness and/or probability of dangerousness. As our
socio-legal history on civil commitment and paternalism disclosed, visibility
of the mentally ill has often resulted in incarceration or other forms of
confinement. These outcomes follow today despite differences in diagnosis
among physicians and low rates of accurate predictions. Critics of this
approach have likened these police power commitments to preventive
detention, 236 and have dismissed the claim that a loss of liberty is warranted
in order to prevent future possible harm. 237 The American Psychiatric
Association's guidelines on state legislation for civil commitment of the
mentally ill, recommend limiting the police power function. 238 By the same
token, however, they encourage an expansion of the parenspatriaecommitment
criteria. This would subject a greater number of mentally ill persons to custodial
confinement for treatment purposes,239 especially when they are considered to
be obviously ill.240
The legal system as well demonstrates its support for the paternalistic value
of custody. Some observers have suggested that deinstitutionalization made
the community the functional equivalent of the hospital. 241 Those services once
availed in a psychiatric facility increasingly became the responsibility of the
community.2 42 As several commentators have indicated, the conditions in
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which many mentally ill persons live in community settings is simply
deplorable. 24 3 Often care and services do not extend beyond the administration
of medication.2 44 And the influence of mental health lawyers and the courts in
promulgating such a system is immeasurable and well documented. 245
Another aspect to the important social value of custody is the procedural
standard of proof required at civil commitment hearings. Unlike criminal
prosecutions where the state must demonstrate beyond a reasonabledoubt ( 90%
certain) that the accused is responsible for the commission of a crime, the
burden of persuasion in confinement proceedings is based upon a showing of
clearand convincing evidence (75% certain). 246 The implication is that psychiatric
patients are afforded a procedural safeguard less than what is availed to
criminal defendants. 247 It is therefore easier (and therefore desirable) to confine
mental health consumers who may be dangerous to self or others or who may
be gravely disabled than it is to incarcerate alleged felons. The only justification
for such a policy is that a temporary loss of liberty (preventive detention) is in
the best interest of society and the individual psychiatric citizen. 248 In these
instances, proponents argue, it is better to be safe than sorry.
C. Treatment
A third paternalistic value underscoring involuntary hospitalization, civil
commitment laws, and policies is a concern for treatment. On psychiatry's part,
this is manifested not only by the administration of antipsychotic medications
and other clinical interventions, but by the medical community's conscious
effort to control "crazy" behavior.249 This is accomplished by identifying those
activities which fall outside the boundaries of normative conduct. The
American Psychiatric Association relies upon its Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual to categorize behavior along a continuum of craziness. 250 Of course,
the impact of such classifications is to "treat" behaviors that psychiatry, as
reflected by prevailing social norms, deems unbefitting. 25 1 Judicial complicity
in this scheme is evidenced by the court's deference to the medical
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community's professional consensus in psychiatric matters. 252 As we have
argued, such deference is present not simply in appellate case law, but in the
administrative proceeding as well.
Further evidence of paternalism-as-treatment in current civil commitment
laws and practices comes from an administrative court's determination that a
particular consumer is not "crazy" ill. Consequently, involuntary
hospitalization does not follow. In essence, courts and/or tribunal decision
brokers determine that an individual is "well" in the clincolegal sense and
maintain that it is therapeutic to release the person from custody. This brand
of treatment may include a discharge plan (a medication regimen and
outpatient therapy). However, this plan, when disregarded by the mental
health system user, can and does escalate the consumer to crisis and eventual
re-hospitalization. A recent study of a model program in the state of
Massachusetts found that the rate of re-petitions for civil commitment and/or
re-hospitalization was staggering. Even when funds were provided for
community-based services and support, and even when the chronically
disabled persons of this model program were believed to be capable of living
in the community (some 90%), only 5% did not suffer any psychiatric setbacks.
As the outcome study's prime investigator concluded: '[Llife for [many]
patients [became one of] decompensation in the residential setting,
stabilization in the hospital, return to the residential setting, decompensation
again, and the cycle repeat[ed]." 253 When a person is discharged and treated
on an outpatient basis, there is considerable doubt about the therapeutic and
efficacious consequence of this action, especially when the result is "re-volving
door" institutional care.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Thusfar we have provided an historical account of events during the past
twenty five years which are primarily responsible for present day confinement
practices, discussed the context in which law and psychiatry speak for the
mentally ill, evaluated three controversial policies that magnify clincolegal
tensions in commitment matters, and outlined values underpinning judicial
and psychiatric decision-making. At this juncture, rather than rejecting
outright the psychiatric and legal vision of treatment and liberty a more
reasonable approach requires fashioning a policy that incorporates the salient
contributions of both professions. Such an orientation is critical if a futuredirected policy in civil commitment matters is to be established.
Striking a proper balance between confinement and liberty is not an easy
task. In the past, while clinical intervention left unchecked produced

252
See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp.
1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984),

25 3 JEFFREY L. GELLER, ET AL., THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE WITH FUNDED
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: A DECADE OF PROMISES, PRODUCTS AND PROBLEMS UNDER THE
BREWSTER V. DUKAKIS CONSENT DECREE

17 (1989).

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 7:131

frightening asylum conditions, 254 legal remedies worshipping the treasure of
liberty only applaud an ideal at the expense of real human suffering.255 A
middle ground position must accept the premise that limited psychiatric
intervention for therapeutic purposes (including coercive treatment) is
sometimes warranted. This holds true especially for persons so severely
affected by their disorder that they are "no longer capable of making a rational
choice whether to continue in [their] present state or to seek treatment for [their]
mental illness. 2 56 The difficulty with this proposition is the tendency on the
part of psychiatrists to over-estimate the benefits of a particular treatment
regimen and delimit the harm while mental health lawyers, on the other hand,
acknowledge the harm and de-emphasize the benefits.257 These perspectives
are understandable given medicine's deterministic affection for more and
better science and the law's right-conscious esteem for more and better
258
justice.
In order to construct a civil commitment policy infused with the insights of
both professions, understanding the essential needs of mental health
consumers is a prerequisite to any future policy aimed at improving the mental
health care system. Although this undertaking addresses only a limited aspect
of involuntary hospitalization, the psychiatric and legal implications for such
an approach refocuses critical attention on the disabled citizen's heretofore
misplaced interests. We have identified five consumer-based needs that require
psychiatric, legal and other constituency recognition before it is possible to
move beyond the present climate of uncertainty and abandonment in civil
commitment matters. Consideration of these issues could help reduce the
mutual antagonisms that plague both professions by serving as the first step
toward shaping a policy that is as well designed as it is well intentioned.
A. Quality Care
The constitutional right to quality care is the most fundamental interest at
stake for psychiatric patients in civil commitment proceedings. Although this
issue has received some attention from psychiatric 259 and legal 260
commentators, these investigations mostly address the right to such care in
medication refusals. A more general right to quality care recognizes the
intrinsic dignity of human beings no matter how disabled or dysfunctional. It
254
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is a liberty interest that encompasses the right to be free from bodily
intrusions, 261 the right to bodily integrity,262 and the right to autonomy and
self-determination. 263 Each of these rights is directly linked to a more basic
claim to personhood. Given past psychiatric abuses, a healthy skepticism
regarding the role of mental health professionals to treat therapeutically rather
than socially control is certainly understandable. Nonetheless, allowing
treatment discretion for the psychiatric profession is acceptable provided: 1);
the quality of intervention is recognized by the established medical community
in which civil liberties are fully respected, 2); the clinical team's accountability
for treatment decisions is monitored regularly, and 3); the consumer, a peer
advocate if requested, and other affected, non-hospital personnel are
participants in the commitment/treatment process. This is not to suggest that
a costly and time-consuming system be erected as much as it is to underscore
the importance of fully exploring the manner in which quality care can in fact
be administered. It is an on-going process that requires an assessment by
physicians, attorneys, community representatives and the consumer.
B. ProtectionAgainst UnnecessaryHarm
An extension of the right to quality care is the right to be protected from
harmful interventions. 264 Although the literature is voluminous on the adverse
effects of institutional confinement, benevolent coercion for chronically
mentally ill persons can be more than custodial and the administration of
antipsychotic medication can be more than heuristic. Part of the solution lies
in understanding how psychiatric facilities are both physically and socially
constructed in ways that institutionalize the mentally ill. Some recent
social-psychological literature is examining the community model as an
appropriate paradigm for greater social cohesion and personal well-being in
diverse organizational settings.265 If the harm that is caused by commitment
and the treatment course that follows is to be reduced, greater exploration in
this area of social designing is necessary. Both physicians and patients' rights
advocates need to demonstrate an increased sensitivity to how social and
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physical space can be configurated in sucha way that benefits the mental health
consumer. 2 66
C. Safe, Supportive, and Affordable Housing
An evaluation of civil commitment raises important questions concerning
alternative care that is as efficacious as hospital confinement but is as
non-restrictive as one's disability will allow. 267 An absence of affordable
housing stock that is both structurally safe and interpersonally supportive,
substantially narrows choice-making prospects for civil commitment parties.
Nonetheless, for a system of involuntary treatment to be as effective in caring
about the mentally disordered as it can be, pursuing the full spectrum of
available treatment possibilities must be acknowledged as absolutely
essential. 268 Too often commitment proceedings are tainted by a dispassionate
recounting of somatic symptoms and a detached verbalizing of adversarial
rhetoric. Given that the goal of involuntary treatment is to return the consumer
to a mental state in which the individual can make an informed and rational
decision about their acceptance of the prescribed intervention,269 and given
that this intervention is to be least restrictive upon one's liberty, 270 then
evaluating the safe, supportive, and affordable housing options in a particular
jurisdiction must be factored into the decision-making equation that attorneys
and physicians undertake. If the commitment hearing can delve into deeply
personal renditions of human suffering and misery, then a deliberate
evaluation of non-institutional, efficacious treatment is quite reasonable.
D. Understandingthe Consumer's World
A significant problem confronting both medical and legal personalities in
civil commitment matters is the version of truth/justice these individuals
embrace as knowledge and understand as power. Advances in both the
physical and social sciences have fostered a society in which people are
normalized and de-pathologized. 27 1 This is especially the case with the
mentally ill. The locus of responsibility for caring for these citizens has shifted
from the family and local community to a group of trained psychiatric
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professionals. 272 These experts assert the informed capacity to understand and
treat mental health consumers. 273 The result is that we have fashioned a system
that esteems the psychiatric community's worldview. 274 Social meanings and
acceptable behaviors are governed by the moral treatment of those
professionals who exercise treatment power. In a culture where respect is
afforded science, scientific assertions are an exercise of power that reduce the
275
merits of other knowledge claims as less rigorous and, therefore, less valid.
The implications for such a monopoly of power are far-reaching. Not only are
the mentally ill left to the moral entrepreneurship of the psychiatric profession,
but this profession's version of truth, of power, is crystallized through the
formation of laws affecting the care and treatment of the mentally disordered.
The "science" of law and psychiatry is representative of a certain approach
2 76
that reflects the interests and attitudes of only certain members in society. It
277
is an approach that relies upon linear, rational thinking to arrive at truth.
There can only be one commitment outcome in a particular hearing. This
outcome must be based upon only well-established and time-tested scientific
truths, honored by only universally applicable legal precedents. This logic
reduces uncertainty, ambiguity, unpredictability, multiplicity and difference to
unity and sameness. Intuitively, such an orientation appears
counter-productive. Clearly, psychiatric citizens do not easily fit this
uni-dimensional worldview. The result is that they are often normalized and
institutionalized to perpetuate "the demands of an organized society."278 The
totalizing effect of this legal and medical perspective denies not only the
heterogeneity of the mentally disordered as a class of people, but the
individuality of those consumers within this group. Both law and psychiatry
must be more open to an approach that is comfortable with the contradictions,
inconsistencies and complexities that are the stuff of human existence.
Adopting this point of view can only further serve to understand the
interiorized needs of mentally disabled citizens.
E. Re-examining the Civil Commitment Hearing Process
On a practical level, successfully understanding the previous need entails
reevaluating how the commitment process unfolds. One commentator has
suggested that the "court of last resort" functions as a consensual and
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commonsense arena in which psychiatric and legal decision-brokers decide the
fate of mental health clients. 279 Our experience at these proceedings supports
this claim. Deferential dialogue all too frequently anticipates the hearing
outcome. The point is not that this result is unacceptable. Accommodation is
essential but not at the expense of advocacy.280 Usually, the entire affair is
audiotaped or a stenographer is present promoting an air of formality. The
parties present include the attending psychiatrist, perhaps some members of
the treatment team, an attorney representing the hospital, an administrative
law judge, some hospital security if necessary, the petitioner a defense attorney
and the consumer. There can be little doubt that such an atmosphere engenders
limited patient warmth or comfort. This speaks to the sort of impersonal and
perfunctory approach the legal and psychiatric professions typically rely upon
in these instances. 28 1 The belief that a sterile and antiseptic environment
somehow makes for friendly and open client discourse is at best short-sighted.
This manner of communication demands a kind of perfection that compels the
psychiatric citizen to live out the "crazy" role that she/he obviously knows all
to well. On occasion, our experience has been that when this performance is
not forthcoming, there is some suspicion about whether the client is
perpetrating a hoax. Of course, when the disordered person performs as
expected, the audience is generally willing to grant what, after all, the behavior
only serves to affirm; namely, that the person is ill, dangerous and/or gravely
disabled and requires involuntary hospitalization and treatment.
Not only is the commitment process questionable, but the hearing outcome
is susceptible to greater risk of error and wrongful confinement. 282 Although
the standard of proof required by the Constitution places a stricter burden of
persuasion upon the state than the preponderance of the evidence criterion
does, 283 determining whether commitment is warranted should require no less
a procedural safeguard than the reasonable doubt measure afforded criminal
defendants. 284 While the clear and convincing standard does reduce possible
hearing outcome error, some courts have recognized the importance of
285
applying the reasonable doubt measure in matters of involuntary treatment.
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A consumer-conscious approach recognizes the need for a supportive,
comfortable environment governed by rules of informality and
relationship-building, in which service needs are emphasized and liberty
interests are fully protected. While we recognize this is the language of
community,286 it is precisely this orientation that urges people to openly
communicate rather than mechanically accommodate. The former is inviting
and the latter is distancing. Other non-hospital staff, including a peer advocate
or community residents affected by the proceeding's outcome, can offer
valuable insight into the consumer's on-going behavioral patterns. This
testimony could make the difference between in-patient commitment or total
discharge. Because of this very real possibility, concerned citizens should be
notified of the hearing date, encouraged to attend and asked to participate in
the process. In a very meaningful way, the civil commitment hearing is like a
town meeting: a member is in distress and all interested parties must work
together to resolve the problem. Unfortunately, the present system does not
fully adopt this point of view and commitment decisions are all too often made
by those with limited information and resources.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In our analysis of civil commitment laws and confinement practices in
general, we have endeavored to demonstrate how the past twenty-five years
have been marked by disappointing clinicolegal decision-making specifically
for the consumer. Influenced by a belief in treatment 2 87 and a preference for
liberty,288 the paternalisitc tensions created by such a polarity of positions has
taken a substantial toll on the lives of many psychiatrically ill citizens. Not only
has the stigma of mental illness been further advanced by psychiatric and legal
commitment practices, but the entire system of care has fallen short of its
responsibility to deliver much needed services. While uncertainty and
abandonment have more recently been the familiar catchwords in mental
health law, the possibility for improving the present apparatus is within reach.
Our contention is that exploring the values that underscore the legal and
medical approach to involuntary civil commitment helps to contextualize why
antagonisms have been so intense and intervention has been so disappointing.
Rather than dismantling the entire system, the first step to fashioning a well
designed commitment strategy requires a synthesis of the inherent wisdom
found in each position. To that end, the benevolence of coercive treatment is
recognized in limited circumstances where the patient lacks sufficient
judgement to make a rational choice about continuing or discontinuing the
prescribed treatment regimen. In addition, we maintain that establishing a
client-based assessment of what needs are in the best interest of the consumer
286
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is a preliminary but necessary component to improving the present policy. This
process reveals that there are five compelling client interests that require further
consideration by both legal and psychiatric decision makers. A right to quality
care, protection against unnecessary harm, decent, affordable housing, greater
understanding of the consumer's worldview and a reconfiguration of the
hearing process itself, are matters that significantly restore the interests of the
consumer to their proper position of priority
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with such an approach is in its
implementation. It is one thing to assert basic human needs or an alternative
perspective from which to consider the meaning of commitment, but it is
another to have these rights and ideas accepted as a more balanced account
that respect treatment needs and liberty demands. The extent to which
physicians, hospital personnel, attorneys, community advocates, consumers
and other invested constituencies participate in this process of debate and
discovery, will determine the degree of success these recommendations will
yield. The present crisis in civil commitment laws and practices is not an
endless chasm filled with consternation and despair. The most reasonable
solution-seems to entail a recognition that law and psychiatry continue to offer
insights that should not be readily dismissed. By starting from a position that
affirms the consumer's needs and interests, this preliminary step initiates
reform and invites resolution. To be sure, a system that values humane
treatment and safeguards precious liberties can effect the type of change that
will steer us away from abandonment, provided we remember that the
fundamental needs of psychiatric citizens must always come first.

